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Termination Rights and the Real
Songwriters
By Geoffrey P. Hull*
Collaboration- the act of more than
one songwriter writing a song-has seldom,
if ever, been more popular or prevalent in
popular music. A perusal of a recent Billboard
Hot 100 singles chart revealed that 85 of the
charted songs had more than one writer in
their credits. Of the fifteen with single writer
credits, thirteen were by the recording artists.
The other two were remakes of decades-old
hits.1 More often than not, especially on the
pop charts, some of the co-writers are the
recording artists or the producers of the
recording. Many times these artist and
producer co-writers have actually written part
of the song. Other times, however, they may
have been involved in a deal that granted co-
writer credits in exchange for recording the
song. What are the implications of the
creation of phony co-writer status for the
copyright ownership and for the rights of the
"real" authors? This Article attempts to
unravel the situation created by overreaching
I. Co-Authorship in Songwriting
The extent to which producers, artists,
label executives, and others may demand
writer credits and shares of copyrights in
return for recording a song is'difficult to
determine. It is clear that the practice is
longstanding. Al Jolson reportedly got one-
third writer credit and income on the song
"California Here I Come," though the song
was actually written by Buddy DeSylva and
Joe Meyer.2 ASCAP lists 43 compositions with
Jolson as a co-writer.3 Elvis Presley's Presley
Music and Gladys Music were created so that
Elvis could own the publishing rights to songs
he recorded, or could become a co-writer as
well. Elvis' rights in "Heartbreak Hotel" were
likely a result of this arrangement. 4 BMI lists
22 compositions with Presley as a co-writer.
5
Record label executives George Goldner of
Gee Records and Morris Levy of Big Seven
Music/Roulette Records listed themselves as
authors on
"Al Jolson reportedly got one-
third writer credit and income
on the song "California Here I
Come," though the song was
actually written by Buddy
DeSylva and Joe Meyer."
artists and producers. It argues that "real"
authors have a remedy to get their copyrights















and Levy as co-
writer on three compositions. More recently,
the New York Post reported that Celine Dion
and her husband/manager were demanding
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20 percent of publishing royalties for putting
songs on the "Let's Talk About Love" album.7
Songwriter Jimmy Webb, writer of "By The
Time I Get to Phoenix," "Up, Up and Away,"
"The Worst That Could Happen," "Mac Arthur
Park," and "Wichita Lineman" recounts,
On one occasion I sat at the piano and
played a song for a staff producer who
made a couple of diffident suggestions
- one of which I thought was not too
bad, and which I subsequently
incorporated rather absentmindedly
into the finished product. He recorded
the song, sang it himself, had the
recording pressed up before I knew it,
and there under the song's title in
parentheses, his name was included
with mine [as a co-writer].8
This Business of Music notes, "Some
dissatisfied publishers claim they are forced to
share copyrights with recording stars and
record company publishing affiliates, and that
this is akin to payola; however the practice
appears uncoerced from a legal point of view."9
It suggests that a contractual "cut-in" share of
royalties for artists or labels in publishing
income is preferable to a "co-writing" credit or
co-ownership of the copyright. "Asking for a
cut-in is not the same as demanding to be
named a co-writer of the composition to obtain
a share of the writer credits and payments from
ASCAP or BMI [or SESAC]. The latter practice
may constitute a fraudulent registration in the
Copyright Office."10 Part IV, below, discusses









of a song later
becomes a co-
writer in name
or producer's publishing company. In one
instance, the original writer may have agreed
to, or at least tacitly accepted, the other party's
presence, perhaps as an incentive to get a
producer or artist to record the song. In the
other, the original writer did not agree to other
party's partial copyright ownership; the other
party simply inserted his or her name in the
copyright registration or album credits as a
writer.
If the music publisher to whom the
original writer transferred copyright ownership
in exchange for royalties cuts in, or shares, the
publisher's share of copyright ownership or
earnings with a third party, then the author
initially should have no objection. Such
arrangements would not usually reduce the
writer's standard fifty percent share of the
publishing revenues. On the other hand, if the
original writer finds that the recording artist or
producer demands a share of the credits and
rights as a songwriter or publisher to get the
song recorded, then the original writer is at a
disadvantage. Faced with the superior
bargaining and gate-keeping power of an artist
or producer, the original writer must either
share writer credits and royalties or look
elsewhere to get the song recorded. For songs
that have already become hits, the writers could
probably find other outlets for their recordings.
The same is not true for previously unrecorded
songs of undetermined value, where the original
writer has almost no choice other than to allow
the artist or producer to be listed as a co-writer
and give up a share of the earnings. With the
duration of copyright now lasting generally for
life of the author plus seventy years," or 95
"If the recording artist or
producer does not create any
of the song, then they cannot
be authors. in the strict
Constitutional sense of the
only, obtains word,"
some or all of
the publishing rights on the song, or gets a split years for works created and published before
of revenues or music publishing with the artist's 1978,12 songwriters may not have an option.
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producers claim shares of the copyrights as
writers when they are not. If the artists and
producers are not really joint authors, as will
be explored below, then they must be licensees
or transferees. If that is the case, then their
rights to utilize the work are subject to statutory
termination of transfers by the original writer(s)
or their heirs under the termination of transfers
provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976.13
A. Co-writing and Joint
Authorship
It is quite common, especially in
musical compositions, for more than one
author to be involved in the creation of the
work. In most of these situations, the
definitions of the Copyright Act regard them
as "joint authors." A "joint work" is one
"prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole."1 4 The legislative history
suggests that, when one songwriter creates the
words to a song and another creates the music,
they would be creating joint works because
their works are designed to be interdependent
parts of a whole.'5 Certainly, when both writers
contribute to both parts of a song, they would
be creating a joint work. A song may be
considered a joint work even where a lyricist
wrote the words before he knew the identity of
the composer, as long as that is what he had
intended.'
6
Once the work is deemed to be "joint,"
there are several presumptions that take effect.
Joint authors are generally treated similarly to
tenants in common. 7 The statute itself terms
them as "co-owners" of the copyright.' 8 Their
shares are presumed to be equal, not related to
their contributions, unless there is some written
indication to the contrary. In Papa's-June Music,
Inc. v. McLean, the court held that Harry
Connick, Jr. and Ramsey McLean owned equal
shares in the works in question because there
was no agreement prior to their creation that
the shares were to be anything other than
equal. ' 9 In past collaborations, McLean and
Connick agreed to split their ownership 30/70,
respectively.20 The court noted that a split other
than 50/50 constituted a transfer of copyright
ownership and, as such, had to be in writing.
21
McLean had made Connick aware that he
wanted to alter the arrangement for the songs
in question, but Connick proceeded to assume
a 30/70 split, asserting an oral agreement on
the previous split.22 In requiring a written
agreement, Judge Cedarbaum stated,
An author can mistakenly or
fraudulently claim an oral transfer of
copyright ownership from his joint
author. If joint authors are forced to
put their agreement into writing, there
is less opportunity for fraud or mistake.
Moreover, if an agreement to alter the
statutory presumptions of equal
ownership and equal right to license and
perform the joint work is put into
writing, the authors will have less need
to resort to the courts to resolve disputes
about the terms of their mutual
understanding. 23
As co-owners, they may not sue each other for
infringement because each has a right to utilize
the work.
A critical fact examined in questions of
joint works is the intention of the authors. The
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice303
"A more difficult question is the
extent to which a contribution
must be made by a putative
co-author in order for that person
to be accorded the status of a'joint
author.' "
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statute requires that they have the "intention court stated, "What distinguishes the writer-
that their contributions be merged into editor relationship and writer-researcher
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary relationship from the true joint author
whole. ' 24 The legislative history, court relationship is the lack of intent of both
decisions, and commentators all underscore participants in the venture to regard
the importance of the intent of the authors. The themselves a joint authors. 31 In the case of
House Report notes: the producer or recording artist asking to be
considered co-writers, if the actual writer agrees
The touchstone here is the intention, at both parties may intend that the producer or
the time the writing is done, that the recording artist be considered a co-writer, but
parts be absorbed or combined into an that intention did not exist at the time the work
integrated unit, although the parts was created. Furthermore, the expression of
the "intent"
takes the form of
6eth recording artist an "agreement"
recorfn or forced on the
producer is not an "author" original author
by overreaching
on the part ofwithin the m eaning of the the putative co-
author in acopyright act.."' ri




themselves may be either 'inseparable' bargaining power. On the other hand, if a
(as the case of a novel or painting) or writer took a mostly completed song to a
'interdependent' (as in the case of a recording artist or producer "intending" to
motion picture, opera, or the words and finish it with the other person as a co-writer, a
music of a song). 5  court would likely find the requisite intent to
create a joint work.
Nimmer, for instance, states that, generally,
there cannot be an implied agreement to create B. Fake Co-Writers as Joint
a joint work after one of the parts has been Authors
completed because there was no intention on The Constitution grants Congress the
the part of the first author to do so at the time power to protect the writings of "authors."
32
of creation.26 The House Report even posits As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the term
the example that one writing a song or novel "author" means "he to whom anything owes
with the hope that it will be used for a motion its origin. ' '33 More specifically, the Court has
picture does not become a joint author of the noted, "[als a general rule, the author is the
motion picture because the song or novel is a party who actually creates the work, that is,
separate work of authorship created prior to the person who translates an idea into a fixed,
the movie.27 The leading cases of Childress v. tangible expression entitled to copyright
Taylor28, Thomson v. Larson29, and Almuhammed protection." 34 If the recording artist or producer
v. Lee 30 all focus on the intent of the putative does not create any portion of the song, then
co-authors at the time of the writing. In those they cannot be authors in the strict,
cases, the collaboration and contributions were constitutional sense of the word.
made at the time of writing. In Childress and Courts and commentators have all
Thomson, the contributions were of a concluded that there must be some kind of
dramaturge; in Almuhammed, they were of a "authorship" contribution in order to be
researcher for Spike Lee's movie of the considered an "author." Nimmer states, "the
Autobiography of Malcolm X. In Childress, the contribution must be one of authorship in
Spring 2005
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order to constitute the contributor a joint
author. For instance, one who merely
contributes financing should not, by reason of
such fact, be entitled to claim as a joint
author."3- Thus, one court concluded that a
producer who "'made no musical or artistic
contribution' to the tapes [and] did not serve
as the engineer at the sessions or direct the
manner in which the songs were played or
sung" could not be a joint author of a
recording.
36
A more difficult question is the extent
to which a contribution must be made by a
putative co-author in order for that person to
I"A writer who is not ic
copyright law to oblige all joint authors to make
copyrightable contributions, leaving those with
non-copyrightable contributions to protect
their rights through contract."
41
In a case that applied the Goldstein
principle to musical works, the court in BTE v.
Bonnecaze42 held that 'Better Than Ezra's' former
drummer could not claim a share of the group's
song copyrights unless he had contributed
something beyond "ideas" and "working up"
the song so that it could be recorded. The court
observed that other courts had adopted the
Goldstein test, noting, "[tihe insistence on
copyrightable contributions by all putative joint
authors might
serve to prevent
Jentified as some spurious
claims by those
sucn on the reg.stration must prove
that he is an author. Similarly,
actual authors have to disprove that
someone who is listed as an author
is not actually an author."
be accorded the status of a "joint author." The
joint author status is significant since joint
authors own equal shares of the copyrights.
Although neither the courts nor commentators
require equal contributions, the prevailing view
is that the contributors must make separate,
copyrightable contributions in order to have a
claim for joint author status. 37 This is the view
expressed by Paul Goldstein 3 and adopted by
the Second Circuit in the leading joint
authorship case of Childress v. Taylor.3 9 In that
case, Taylor, who came up with the idea of a
play about the life of comedienne "Moms"
Mabley, could not be a joint author simply
because she had contributed the initial idea for
the play and ideas for some of the scenes. "Care
must be taken," said the court, "to ensure that
true collaborators in the creative process are
accorded the perquisites of co-authorship and
to guard against the risk that a sole author is
denied exclusive authorship status simply
because another person rendered some form
of assistance." 4 The court concluded, that "[lit




of the efforts of a
sole author of a
copyrightable





Similarly, the recording artist's
interpretive variations in the recorded
performance would not qualify as
copyrightable contributions to the
composition. The mechanical license typically
used by the record companies to record and
distribute copies of a recording either
incorporates by reference the provisions of the
compulsory mechanical license of 17 U.S.C.
§115, or alters them in part to suit the record
companies' desires to reduce the statutory rate
or alter the accounting provisions. In either
event, the typical license and statutory
provisions preclude one from considering a
performer's stylistic variations as copyrightable
because such variations comprise a derivative
work; thus, they are generally excluded from
the license. A typical negotiated license states,
"The license includes the privilege of making a
musical arrangement of the Composition to the
extent necessary to conform it to the style or
manner of interpretation of the performance
involved, but the arrangement made (i) may
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice305
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not change the basic melody or fundamental
character of the lyrics of the composition, (ii)
shall not be subject to protection under the Act
by Licensee as a derivative work .... ,,45 This
mirrors the statutory language of the
compulsory license provision.
4 6
Approaching this question from the
other direction, i.e., looking at what might
constitute a derivative work in the first place,
the prevailing view is perhaps summarized in
Woods v. Bourne Co., 4 7 in which Bourne claimed
that a piano edition of a song was sufficient to
make it a derivative work and, hence, immune
from termination under the derivative works
exception. The Court in Woods stated:
In order therefore to qualify as a
musically 'derivative work,' there must
be present more than mere cocktail
pianist variations of the piece that are
standard fare in the music trade by any
competent musician. There must be
such things as unusual vocal treatment,
additional lyrics of consequence,
unusual altered harmonies, novel
sequential uses of themes -something
of substance added making the piece
to some extent a new work with the old
song embedded in it but from which
the hew has developed. It is not merely
a stylized version of the original song
where a major artist may take liberties
with the lyrics or the tempt, the listener
hearing basically the original tune.
4 8
Thus, the recording artist or producer is not an
"author" within the meaning of the copyright
act because (1) they did not make a
copyrightable contribution to the musical
composition, and/or (2) it was not the intent of
the actual author at the time of creation of the
work that the producer or recording artist be a
joint author. Falsely claiming authorship on
the copyright registration form cannot create
status as an author.
C. The Effect of a Registration
Showing the Phony Author
as a Co-Author
Unlike the Patent Office, the Copyright
Office does not actually grant copyrights.
Rather, copyright protection begins upon the
creation of the work, i.e., "when it is fixed in a
copy of phonorecord for the first time."49 The
act of registration of the work with the
Copyright Office is permissive and, as the
statute says, "not a condition of copyright
protection.."5 0 Registration does provide the
copyright holder with certain advantages,
however. If completed within five years of first
publication, the registration is prima facie
evidence of the validity of.the copyright and of
the facts stated in the registration certificate
(which is simply a copy of the application
form)."' Registration may be completed at any
time during the life of the copyright, but is
required of works that originate in the United
States in order to sue for infringement. 2 For a
successful plaintiff to obtain statutory damages
or attorney's fees, a registration must be made
within three months of publication or before
the infringement took place.53
While registration and the content of
the registration application is important, it is
not entirely determinative. The Copyright
Office does not make determinations of
ownership based on the registration claims, as
there would be no reliable way to determine
the validity of authorship statements.5 4 The
Copyright Act requires only that the Copyright
Office determine that the material "constitutes
copyrightable subject matter and that the other
legal and formal requirements of this title have
been met .... ,,5- At that point, the register
"shall" issue the certificate of registration. As
one court put it, "[r]egistration does not
determine ownership.
56
Since there is no actual determination
of authorship at the time of registration,
considering the registration form prima facie
evidence shifts the burden of proof to the party
claiming that the facts are contrary to those
indicated on the registration form. A writer
who is not identified as such on the registration
must prove that he is an author. Similarly,
actual authors must disprove the claim that
someone who is listed as an author is not
actually an author.5 ' Goldstein notes that the
presumption of the validity of the facts is not
as strong as that of the validity of the
copyright. 58 Furthermore, the presumption
"merely orders the burdens of proof. The
plaintiff should not ordinarily be forced in the
first instance to prove all of the multitude of
Spring 2005
Termination Rights and the Real Songwriters
facts that underline the validity of the copyright
unless the defendant, by effectively challenging
them, shifts the burden of doing so to the
plaintiff."59 In Merchant v. Lymon,6 ° for
example, the court considered whether a record
producer who regularly put his name as an
author on copyright registrations could be
considered an owner. It noted that a pattern of
consistently claiming to be an author on other
works that he had not created was evidence
that enabled the jury to rebut the presumption
of authorship as stated in the registration forms.
Even so, there is the practical matter that
evidence as to who wrote a particular
composition may be difficult to produce
twenty-five to forty years 61 after the original
fact.62 A demonstration recording prior to the
putative writer's exposure to the work would
be good evidence. Testimony of others who
heard the song being performed by the actual
writers may also be good evidence.
II. Termination Rights
The Copyright Act of 1976 gives authors
a non-transferable right to terminate transfers
(which term includes assignments and
exclusive licenses) 63 and non-exclusive licenses
of the copyrights in their works during a five
year period that begins after 35 years from the
date of the execution of the grant and runs
through 40 years after the date of execution of
the grant. If the grant involves the right to
publish the work, the termination right begins
after 40 years after the grant or 35 years after
first publication, whichever ends earlier.64 For
"Not only would t
songwriter be precli
getting a full share of thi
upon termination, they %
precluded from even ge
the copyrights through a
proceeding"
works whose federal copyrights were subsisting
before January 1, 1978, "[t]ermination of the
grant may be effected at any time during a
period of five years beginning at the end of fifty-
six years from the date the copyright was
originally secured, or beginning on January 1,
1978, whichever is later."65 The Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act66 in 1998 added
an additional termination provision for pre-
1978 works whose termination period had
expired and the author or other termination
rights owners had not previously exercised the
termination right.67 For those works, an
additional five-year termination period begins
"at the end of 75 years from the date copyright
was originally secured."68 For transfers
executed on or after January 1, 1978, only those
made by the author are subject to
termination. 69 For transfers made prior to
January 1, 1978, those executed by the author,
the author's surviving widow or widower,
children, grandchildren or a deceased author's
executor, administrator, personal
representative, or trustee are subject to
termination. 70 If the transfer was testamentary,
it is not terminable in either case. The actual
wording of the statute is that transfers
"otherwise than by will" are subject to
termination. 71  In neither case do the
termination provisions apply to works made
for hire.72 That is one of the reasons why, as
the House Report explains, the definition of
works made for hire in the 1976 Act is so
important.
73
Two details of the termination
provisions are particularly crucial to the current
discussion. In the case of joint works, for
transfers made on or after January 1, 1978,
"termination of the grant may be effected by a
majority of the
he actual authors who
executed it .... ,74ided from The legislative
B copyrights history is clearthat the
rould also be requirement of a





something more than fifi
of the termination intere
and recording artist were
transfer means
ty percent ownership
st. 75 If the songwriter
actually joint authors,
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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this would require that both of them act to
terminate any transfer.76 If, for example, the
phony artist/authors had transferred copyrights
to publishing companies they owned, then the
actual songwriter could not terminate such a
transfer without the consent of the artist. Not
only would the actual songwriter be precluded
from getting a full share of the copyrights upon
termination, the songwriter would also be
precluded from getting even half of the
copyrights through a termination proceeding
if the phony "authorship" of the artist or
producer stands. This would doubly thwart
the congressional purpose of protecting authors
against unremunerative transfers.
77
For transfers made before January 1,













requires some affirmative action on the part of
the terminating parties (i.e., notice to the
transferee or licensee whose rights are being
terminated), "the right to take this action
cannot be waived in advance or contracted
away."82 An author/songwriter's agreement to
treat someone who has not in fact authored any
portion of the song as a co-writer can certainly
be viewed as an "agreement to the contrary."
It operates to cut off the termination right
because the act of creating the work does not
involve any transfer of ownership that could
be terminated.
This provision has only been
significantly litigated once since passage of the
1976 Act. In Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon
83
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
"From the beginning of the
copyright law revision process in
1965, Congress sought to provide





history indicates that this intentional difference
is because Congress viewed the renewal rights
as creating separate and new "estates." "It
would therefore be inappropriate to impose a
requirement of majority action with respect to
transfers executed by two or more joint
authors."80 For pre-1978 transfers, the actual
songwriters or their heirs would at least be able
to recapture the actual songwriter's share of the
copyrights, even if the status of the phony
author stood.
A second significant provision is that
"[t]ermination of the grant may be effected
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary,
including an agreement to make a will or to
make any future grant. ' 81 Identical language
appears in both the Section 203 and 304
termination provisions. Reflecting on the
"practical compromise" of the Section 203
provisions, the House Report states that
although termination is not automatic and
a settlement agreement entered into in 1969
which stated that Simon had created the
Captain America comic hero as a work made
for hire was an "agreement to the contrary."
The District Court was therefore incorrect in
granting summary judgment to Marvel on the
issue of work made for hire because Simon had
submitted evidence that he was the author and
had created the work prior to any relationship
with Marvel.84 In reaching that conclusion, the
Second Circuit examined the legislative history
of Section 304(c) and concluded that an
agreement that a work was made for hire
entered into after the work was created,
would thwart the clear legislative
purpose and intent of the statute. If an
agreement between an author and
publisher that a work was created for
hire were outside the purview of §
304(c)(5), the termination provision
Spring 2005
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would be rendered a nullity; litigation-
savvy publishers would be able to utilize
their superior bargaining position to
compel authors to agree that a work was
created for hire in order to get their
works published.a
The court also found support in Mills Music,
Inc. v. Snyder 6 that the clear intent of the
termination provisions in general was to protect
authors from "ill-advised and unremunerative
grants that had been made before the author
had a fair opportunity to appreciate the true
value of his work product."8 7 Similarly, the
court found support in Nimmer on Copyright,
which concludes that parties cannot agree that
a work was created for hire when in fact it was
not, because such an agreement would be an
"agreement to the contrary" that could be
terminated.8 8 An after-the-fact agreement that
someone else is an author, when in fact they
are not, should be no less terminable than an
after-the-fact work for hire agreement, or even
a settlement stipulation. Although Marvel
contended that upsetting the settlement
stipulation would open floodgates of litigation,
the court noted, "[i]f the parties intend to
preclude any future litigation regarding
authorship by settling their claims, they need
only comply with the requirements of collateral
estoppel by filling a detailed stipulation of
settlement, complete with sufficient factual
findings on authorship, with the court.
8 9 Of
course, factual findings that the phony author
is in fact an author would not be possible
because the works would have been created
by the songwriter before the artist or producer
entered the picture.
The Marvel court went even further,
ruling that the doctrine of equitable estoppel
"does not supercede § 304(c)." 9 Even though
the authorship claims may relate to "long
dormant copyright ownership issues," said the
court,
[i]n fact, Congress's goal in providing
authors with this termination rights
was to enable them to reclaim long lost
copyright grants. As the district court
correctly recognized, virtually every
copyright holder could fashion a similar
equitable estoppel argument in
response to an author's legitimate
exercise of his termination rights.
Permitting such an exception, however,
would contravene the plain language,
intent, and purpose of § 304(c). 91
From the beginning of the copyright law
revision process in 1965, Congress sought to
provide authors with some means to protect
themselves against "unremunerative transfers"
made prior to any determination of the true
value of the work.92 That purpose has been
recognized in virtually every court opinion that
has addressed termination rights. In Mills
Music, the Supreme Court noted:
[t]he termination right was expressly
intended to relieve authors of the
consequences of ill-advised and
unremunerative grants that had been
made before the author had a fair
opportunity to appreciate the true value
of his work product. That general
purpose is plainly defined in the
legislative history and, indeed, is fairly
inferable from the test of § 304 itself.
93
The often cited House Report language on the
subject states, "[a] provision of this sort is
needed because of the unequal bargaining
position of authors, resulting in part from the
impossibility of determining a work's value until
it has been exploited." 94 The leading treatises
also recognize this important function of the
termination rights.95 Nimmer specifically notes,
"[t]he entire thrust of the termination
procedures is to protect authors given their
unequal bargaining posture." 96
The Supreme Court has considered the
implications of the termination provisions of
the 1976 Act twice since its passage. In Mills
Music, the Court balanced competing interests
of an author (songwriter's heirs), the author's
transferee of rights (music publisher), and the
creators of derivative works (record companies)
whose rights were received through a grant
from the author's original grantee.97 In Stewart
v. Abend, the Court analyzed the termination
provisions to shed light on a film company's
argument that renewal of copyright under the
1909 law should not cut off the rights of the
creator of a derivative work to utilize that work
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice309
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"In the case of a recording artist or
producer falsely claiming
authorship, the link to the original
writers through the publisher can
still be preserved.., even if the link
( to the name-only writers is)
severed."
after renewal. 98 In Stewart the Court took
judicial note of the fact that the termination
provisions embodied in the 1976 Act were the
result of compromises between various
competing interests; when the agreement on
the compromise was reached, the debate all but
ended.99 Therefore, said the Court, "the process
of compromise between competing special
interests leading to the enactment of the 1976
Act undermines any such attempt to draw an
overarching policy out of... [the termination
provision]."'00 That same compromise was
noted in Mills Music'01 and Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 10 2 The highly
negotiated compromise made the Court
reluctant to read into these parts of the statute
any applications that are not clearly apparent
on the face of the statute or in the legislative
history. This reluctance would operate to the
detriment of the artist or producer as a
designated, but not actual, co-writer. They are
not "authors" who have made
"unremunerative" transfers and need to be
protected. Rather, they are the persons who
caused the songwriter to make the
unremunerative transfer in the first place.
III. The Derivative Works Excep-
tion
The statutory termination provisions for
pre-1978 works 03 and post-1978 works'0 4 con-
tain identical language that protects the creators
of derivative works. A derivative work "pre-
pared under authority of the grant before its
termination may continue to be utilized under
the terms and conditions of the grant after its
termination."1 5 In its exploration of the his-














compositions and that they deserve to be al-
lowed to continue to use those recordings, de-
spite a termination of the transfer of rights be-
tween the songwriter and the music publisher.
106 Typically, the songwriter transfers the copy-
rights to the music publisher in exchange for
royalties and possibly advances. The publisher
then licenses others, including record compa-
nies, to utilize the work in exchange for royal-
ties that are usually shared equally with the
songwriter. The question in Mills Music was
whether, following a termination of the trans-
fer from the songwriter to the music publisher,
the music publisher could continue to collect
the license fees from the record company for
recordings made prior to the termination or
whether the record company had to pay those
royalties directly to the songwriter.' 7 If the lat-
ter was the case, the publisher would not be
able to collect their fifty percent as they had
prior to the termination. Drawing a parallel to
the large investment that motion picture pro-
ducers make in creating a motion picture based
on a play or novel, the Court said, "record com-
panies must also make a significant investment
in compensating vocalists, musicians, arrang-
ers, and recording engineers." 108 This protec-
tion allowed the public to benefit because the
derivative work creator had made substantial
investment to bring the public a new form or
version of the original work. It ensured that
the derivative work could continue to be avail-
able and exploited even after a termination of
the transfer to the publisher.0 9 The Court con-
cluded that because the recordings made by
record companies were derivative works based
upon the songs recorded, the derivative works
exception allowed the record companies to con-
tinue to utilize their recordings created prior to
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the termination.11 ° If the record companies
could continue to utilize their works, the Court
reasoned, the "terms and conditions" under
which they could use the work must include
the continued payment to the music publisher.
The music publisher would then continue to
pay half of the royalties collected to the Snyders,
the songwriter's heirs."'
How does that interpretation apply to
the situation where the transfer being
terminated is one that had been made to a
recording artist or producer to persuade them
to make a recording of the song? There are
two possible outcomes, both of which allow
the record company to continue to be able to
use their
derivative work.
Only one of "In cases invc
them causes ship, the cou
royalties to be
paid through accrual of th
the publisher to taking place u
the original
writer only, tion where co
while the other authorship m
outcome directs a
payment of published cop
royalties to the
original writer
and the name-only writers. As discussed below,
the language of the Mills Music decision appears
to support the continued flow of royalties to
both actual and name-only writers for
recordings made prior to the termination.
The license that allows the record
company to make a recording of a song, a
mechanical license, comes from the copyright
owner of the musical composition, the music
publisher. The decision in Mills Music
preserved the grant from the writer to the
publisher and the grant from the publisher to
the label. Otherwise, said the Court, the
songwriters had no right to collect any royalties
at all from the labels. It explained,
[Iff the Exception [derivative works
exception] is narrowly read to exclude
[the publisher] from its coverage, thus
protecting only the class of 'utilizers' as
the Snyders [the writer's heirs] wish, the
crucial link between the record
companies and the Snyders will be
missing, and the record companies will
have no contractual obligation to pay
royalties to the Snyders. If the statute
is read to preserve the total contractual
relationship, which entitled Mills to
make duly authorized derivative works,
the record companies continue to be
bound by the terms of their licenses,
including any terms requiring them to
continue to pay royalties to Mills. 112
In the case of a recording artist or
producer falsely claiming authorship, the link
to the original writers through the publisher
can still be preserved, as Mills Music requires,
lving claims of owner-
rts tend to view the
ne cause of action as
ipon the initial publica-
pyright ownership and
ay be claimed on the
ies."
even if the link to the name-only writers is
severed. Terminating a transfer of partial
ownership rights to the recording artist would
not sever the link between the original writers
and the record labels. Since the record
company, not the artist or producer, has
obtained the license and created the derivative
work, there is no reason to allow the name-
only writers to continue to be able to collect
royalties. The purpose of protecting the public
by making sure that the derivative work will
still be available is served. The purpose of
protecting the investment made by the record
company is also preserved. Both of these goals
of the derivative works exception are achieved
even though the recording artist or producer
may no longer have any rights. The purpose
of protecting the writers from unremunerative
transfers is better served by this result-a result
that the Court recognized as a "principal
purpose" of the termination right."3
The decision in Mills Music was five to
four over a strong dissent." 4 Most
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commentators have concluded that the Court to the termination. Perhaps the royalties
incorrectly analyzed the legislative history, or should be limited to those from the derivative
perhaps the lack of clear legislative history, and work that they created. However, since neither












"Whether a person is an author
or not has bearing on several
important prospective aspects of
the copyright ownership dating




exploitation of derivative works by third
parties, effectively reversing what the parties
had expected their compromise to
accomplish."" 6 It may be that a court could
be persuaded that the situation of the name-
only writer should be interpreted differently
because it is so clearly the result of a transfer
that resulted from unequal bargaining
positions.
On the other hand, the purpose of the
grant or license to the recording artist and
producer is to encourage them to create the
derivative work. Under the "terms and
conditions" of the grant, the derivative work
would be created and the artist or producer
would be treated as co-writers. Should not they,
too, be allowed to continue to collect royalties
because they created the derivative work?
More specifically, the Court clearly read the
statute to require preservation of the "total
contractual relationship."" 7 That includes the
name-only authors' grant of rights to their
publisher and their publisher's mechanical
license to the record company. Even if their
publisher was different from that of the original
writer, the transfer of rights to the name-only
writers ultimately became part of the rights that
the labels obtained to make the recordings.
Therefore, those would presumably also be
preserved by the derivative works exception.
The best case scenario for the name-only
writers would then be much like that of the
publisher in Mills Music. They would be
allowed to continue to collect their share of
royalties for mechanical licenses issued prior
licenses after the effective date of termination,
the original writer would be able to collect the
entirety of any royalties due to writers for
licenses issued after the termination. If the
name-only writers had their own music
publishing companies, their companies would
stand in the same situation as Mills Music-
collecting only for pre-termination licenses.
IV. Statute of Limitations, Laches
and Other Problems
A. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations will
undoubtedly be one of the defenses to an
attempt by a songwriter to assert sole
authorship through a termination action. The
Copyright Act requires that "[n]o civil action
shall be maintained under the provisions of this
title unless it is commenced within three years
after the claim accrued."18 In an infringement
case, the ordinary interpretation is that the
three-year limit begins to run in an
infringement case "when the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the infringement."" 9 In
cases involving claims of ownership, the courts
tend to view the accrual of the cause of action
as taking place upon the initial publication
where copyright ownership and authorship
may be claimed on the published copies. In
Zuill v. Shanahan, the Ninth Circuit held that
an express repudiation of the status of plaintiffs
as co-authors of the Hooked on Phonics music
started the three-year period running.2 0 The
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acts of repudiation included written and
contractual offers to the plaintiffs, and the
copyright notice on published copies of Hooked
on Phonics, which plaintiffs had received.
121
Unlike the situation in an infringement case
where additional infringing acts may occur for
years after an initial infringing act, thereby
prolonging the period during which litigation
may be commenced, the court noted that "[a]n
infringement occurs every time the
copyrighted work is published, but creation
does not."122 Because the plaintiffs in Zuill were
not claiming copyright infringement,
subsequent acts could not cause the accrual of
new causes of action. In fact, they could not
have claimed infringement because co-owners
of copyrights cannot be liable to each other for
infringement; each owns and may exercise the
rights in the work. 123 The court noted that this
was not a case where plaintiffs claimed that
Shanahan was not an author at all, but rather,













limitations of actions provisions to apply only
to remedies, not substantive rights. The court
examined the language from the Senate Report,
which stated that some rights may be enforced
collaterally even though the statute of
limitations for the remedy has already run.
127
The Senate Report used the example of a
mortgage foreclosure after the statute of
limitations for enforcement of a debt had
already run. The case of an author who has a
right of termination of transfers to oust a phony
co-author is in a similar vein. The Zuill court
found no such collateral claim of right in that
case, but Zuill was not a termination case.
Other courts have also held that those
wanting to assert co-authorship may be barred
by the statute of limitations. In Merchant v.
Levy, 128 the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff
teen-aged writers were charged with notice
that they were being denied credit as writers
upon attaining the age of majority in 1961. The
statute of limitations had long since run when
"It makes no sense to apply a
three-year statute of limitations
starting on the date of the
transfer, to a right that does not
even exist until after 35 years
after the date of the transfer."
money are
spent developing a market for the copyrighted
material, and then pounce on the prize after it
has been brought in by another's effort."'125 The
Ninth Circuit based its reasoning partially on
the need for stability and predictability in
copyright ownership, analogizing to the need
for stability in real property where the accrual
of a cause of action by co-owners starts to run
when they are dispossessed, and either may
gain title by adverse possession if the other
doesn't take action in a timely manner.126
The plaintiffs made an interesting claim
in Zuill that might apply to the case of an author
trying to eliminate a phony co-author through
a termination of transfer. They claimed that
the statute of limitations should not bar their
claim because Congress intended the
they filed suit in 1987. This was the case even
though they were under duress from 1969 until
possibly 1984, as they were threatened with
death by the defendant because they were
asking about royalties.
129
Stone v. Williams 3° involved a suit by
the illegitimate daughter of Hank Williams to
be declared an heir to his copyrights and
copyright renewals and to royalties earned
from Williams' compositions. The court
determined that Stone should have known of
her rights in the copyrights as early as 1979.'31
Even though she did not take legal action until
1985 the court said the statute of limitations
did not bar her actions because she was
attempting to assert a right of ownership and
not a remedy. 32 The court noted,
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establishment of one's status as a child
is necessary to maintain an action
alleging deprivation of renewal rights;
since a failure to satisfy such
prerequisites to bringing suit may be
cured and does not forever preclude
relief for infringement, by a parity of
reasoning, a failure to establish status
as a child does not forever preclude
relief for the invasion of renewal
rights.'33
The court went on to say, however, that the
accounting remedy could only take into account
royalties due no more than three years prior to
the filing of the suit.134 The Ninth Circuit
rejected the reasoning in Stone, calling it an
"idiosyncratic" case and finding a difference
between a claim of ownership based on status
as an author and one based on renewal rights
of heirs.
135
In contrast to these decisions stands
Goodman v. Lee, 1 36 where the Fifth Circuit
decided that Shirley Goodman, alleging that
she was a co-author of "Let the Good Times
Roll," could maintain an action for an
accounting under Louisiana law. The jury
determined that the statute had been tolled
because Goodman did not know, and should
not have known, until the copyright was
renewed in 1984 that Leonard Lee had listed
himself as sole author on the copyright
registration form. Then, after using federal law
to determine the question of authorship, the
court applied Louisiana Law regarding the
application for an accounting, which is a state
law remedy. That statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the party first demands
the accounting.
Termination cases should be treated
differently from those involving a situation
where an author seeks a declaration of their
status as co-author ab initio. Whether a person
is an author or not has bearing on several
important prospective aspects of the copyright
ownership dating from the sending of the
termination notice. First, only authors or their
heirs have a right to terminate a transfer. Thus,
if a songwriter made a transfer to an artist or
producer, essentially giving them a share of the
copyright by virtue of allowing them to claim
author status, then that transfer should be
terminable under the statute. Furthermore,
whether the artist or producer is an author has
a bearing on the number of people required to
execute a termination. The statute requires a
majority of the authors who executed the grant
of a joint work to join in its termination.
13 7 If
an author is deceased at the time of termination,
that author's interest may be exercised by the
surviving widow or widower and children (or
grandchildren of a deceased child), or the
author's estate if none of the statutory successors
are alive. 38 As a result, it is important to know
who the authors are and what their shares of
ownership are, as these answers have direct
impact on the statutory right of termination.
In addition, once the notice of
termination is sent to the grantee or licensee,
the reclaimed rights vest on the date of the
service of the termination notice. 139 This
vesting is important to the determination of the
descent of rights in the event that one of those
sending the notice dies prior to the effective
date of termination. Those in whom the rights
vest may also negotiate with the terminated
grantee upon delivery of the notice, but not
with third parties until the effective date of
termination. 4 °
Since there is no statutory right of
termination until after 35 years after the
transfer, or up to 40 years if the transfer
involved the right of publication, the statute of
limitations should not apply. It makes no sense
to apply a three-year statute of limitations
starting on the date of the transfer to a right
that does not even exist until after 35 years after
the date of the transfer. Such a result would
render the termination provisions a nullity.
Furthermore, there is the equivalent of
limitation of actions for termination specifically
built into the statute. If the effective date of
termination does not fall within the allotted
five-year period and the notice of termination
is at least two, but no more than ten, years
before the effective date of termination, the
grant continues in effect. 141 The legislative
history clarifies further, "[t]his section means
that, if the agreement does not contain
provisions specifying its term or duration, and
the author has not terminated the agreement
under this section, the agreement continues for
the term of the copyrights subject to any right
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Laches is an equitable defense that
prevents a plaintiff from pursuing an action
where there has been a delay in asserting a right
or claim, where the delay was not excusable,
and where there was undue prejudice to the
defendant. 143 In the case of a statutory
termination of a transfer, there is no right until
after the passage of the required 35-40 years.
So long as the author exercised the right within
the stated period, there would be no
"unreasonable" delay because the statute itself
defines what is reasonable by establishing a
time frame within which the termination and
notice of termination may take place. Nor
would there be any undue prejudice to the
producer or artist who is simply relying on the
strength of their superior bargaining position
to enforce a transfer of rights that is
unremunerative for the actual author. Finally,
most courts would require that those asking
equitable relief come to the court with "clean
hands." 144 One who, in potential commission
of a fraudulent registration, falsely claims
authorship of a song is misleading the public
and the Copyright Office.
C. Fraudulent Registration
Claims
The Copyright Act criminalizes the act
of "knowingly making a false representation"
on a copyright registration application. 145 Such
actions are punishable by a fine of up to
$2,500.146 To date, however, whether a plaintiff
or defendant fraudulently entered information
on a copyright registration claim has seldom
impacted the outcome of a case. In Testa v.
Janssen,147 a false statement of authorship, later
corrected, did not prevent plaintiffs from
pursuing their claim of infringement by the
song "Keep on Singing" as recorded by Helen
Reddy. The court stated that authorship error
did not harm the defendant and did not relate
to the subject matter of the dispute. Nor does
such a misstatement on authorship affect the
validity of the registration.
1 48
Fraudulent representation on the regis-
tration form does not give rise to any separate
civil cause of action. 149 Specifically relevant to
this point is Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross,150 where
a failure to list the defendant as a co-author on
plaintiff's registration of a computer program
did not create any civil liability for plaintiff in a
counter-suit. The legislative history of the
fraudulent registration section gives no further
indication of any statutory intent beyond its
plain language.
V. Conclusion
Where a recording artist or producer
falsely claims authorship, intent must exist on
the part of both parties at the time the work is
created to enter into a joint authorship status if
there is to be joint authorship. In many cases
involving recording artists or producers listed
as co-authors, this intent does not exist because
the song was completed prior to pitching it to
the artist or producer. There must also be a
copyrightable contribution, or at least some
contribution of authorship, to the work by the
producer or artist. In most cases, there is no
contribution other than making some minor
changes to make the song suitable to the gen-
der or singing style of the performer. The pro-
ducer or artist is not an "author" of the song,
nor was there intent on the part of the original
songwriter to create a joint work. Thus, the
putative author fails both prongs of the defini-
tion of a joint work.
If the song is not a joint work, then there
must be some kind of permission given by the
actual author to record the song, or to be treated
as a joint author. In that case, there needs to be
a written transfer of rights; such a transfer can
be terminated. If there is no written agreement,
then the transfer can only be implied as a non-
exclusive license because the statute requires a
writing for an exclusive license or other transfer
of ownership. Non-exclusive licenses can also
be terminated.
If the putative author protests that they
were supposed to have these rights for the life
of the copyright, that argument also fails. The
termination provisions permit an author to
terminate a transfer notwithstanding an
"agreement to the contrary." In the words of
the House Report, "[t]he right to take this action
cannot be waived in advance or contracted
away." '15' Finally, the situation where a
songwriter must give away part of the
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ownership of the copyright to get the song
recorded is exactly the type of unequal
bargaining situation that the termination
provisions sought to rectify.
15 2
By serving a proper termination notice
on the putative co-author, the actual
songwriters should be able to remove the
conferred status as "author" of the producer
or recording artist, thereby finally claiming
their rightful share of the future proceeds from
the recording, performances, and other uses
of the song.
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